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To the Editor: Salmonella spp. 
cause ≈1.2 million human illnesses an-
nually in the United States (1). Infec-
tions are primarily acquired through 
exposure to contaminated food or 
infected animals (1,2). Since 2007, 
state and local health departments and 
the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention have investigated mul-
tiple salmonellosis outbreaks linked 
to meat purchased at live-bird mar-
kets (LBMs) and live-animal markets 
(LAMs), where poultry and livestock 
are sold for onsite slaughter. These 
markets typically operate in large cit-
ies and serve populations of diverse 
ethnic backgrounds (3).
In 2007, an outbreak involving 
62 case-patients infected with 1 of 
3 S. enterica serotype Schwarzen-
grund strains was investigated in 
Massachusetts; 61% were children 
<5 years of age, including 14 (23%) 
infants <1 year of age, and 96% were 
Asian (Table). A case-patient was 
defined as a person infected with S. 
enterica who had a pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis XbaI restriction en-
zyme pattern indistinguishable from 
the outbreak strain. Exposure to 
poultry purchased at LBMs was re-
ported, and environmental sampling 
at an implicated LBM identified 6 S. 
enterica serotypes, including 1 out-
break strain.
Three subsequent investigations 
of S. enterica serotype Schwarzen-
grund infections were conducted: 
a 2009 outbreak of 50 cases in New 
York, New York; a 2010–2011 multi-
state outbreak of cases predominantly 
in New York, New Jersey, and Mas-
sachusetts; and a 2012 multistate out-
break of cases mostly in Illinois and 
Michigan. Most case-patients in these 
outbreaks were of Asian race or His-
panic ethnicity, but 3/5 case-patients 
in Michigan reported Arab ethnicity; 
>50% were infants or children <5 
years of age.
Among case-patients with avail-
able information, exposure to poultry 
from LBMs was reported by 88% of 
case-patients in the 2009 New York 
investigation, 35% in the 2010–2011 
multistate investigation, and 50% in 
the 2012 multistate investigation. In 
Michigan, the outbreak strain was 
isolated from chicken purchased at an 
LBM and collected from households 
of 2 case-patients.
During 2011–2012, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention 
investigated a nationwide increase in 
S. enterica serotype I,4,[5],12:i- in-
fections (pulsed-field gel electropho-
resis XbaI restriction enzyme pattern 
JPXX01.1314). Although no single 
vehicle was implicated, clusters 
linked to LAMs were identified. In 
Minnesota, 14 illnesses were linked 
to meat from 3 neighboring LAMs. 
Environmental sampling identified 
the outbreak strain from an animal-
holding pen at 1 of the markets. 
Seven case-patients were infants <1 
year of age, and 10 reported Hmong 
ethnicity. In California, 10 illnesses 
likely associated with pork, lamb, 
and beef purchased at 3 LAMs were 
identified; case-patients reported 
Ethiopian and Hmong ethnicity. The 
outbreak strain was isolated from a 
pork leg collected from the freezer 
of a case-patient.
LBMs and LAMs appear to be 
preferred by certain populations for 
cultural, culinary, or religious reasons. 
Exposure to meat from these markets 
is being increasingly recognized as a 























62 38/62	(61) 14/62	(23) 53/54	(98) NA 8/10	(80) 
2009 New	York,	NY JM6X01.0240 50 37/50	(74) 15/50	(30) 7/20	(35) 9/17	(53) 14/16	(88) 
2010–2011 Multistate¶ JM6X01.0240 233 105/209	(50) 19/209	(9) 26/72	(36) 29/72	(40) 28/80	(35) 
2012 Multistate# JM6X01.0323 15 8/15	(53) 3/15	(20) 1/12	(8) 5/12	(42) 6/12	(50) 
*NA,	not	available. 
†Defined by pulsed-field	gel	electrophoresis	XbaI	restriction	enzyme	pattern. 







cause is uncertain, but one factor may 
be an increased number of markets: in 
New York, New York, the number of 
LBMs nearly doubled from 44 to >80 
during 1994–2002 (4). Most case-pa-
tients in these outbreaks had minimal 
direct contact with poultry or livestock 
at these markets; many case-patients 
were infants or young children who 
had not visited the markets or con-
sumed meat. Therefore, one risk fac-
tor appears to be living in a household 
where the meat purchased from these 
markets is handled or consumed.
Several factors could make meats 
from these markets more risky for 
acquiring salmonellosis. Although 
LBMs and LAMs must meet sanita-
tion requirements and prevent product 
adulteration (5–7), most are exempt 
from Food Safety and Inspection Ser-
vice pathogen reduction performance 
standards (8,9) and probably do not 
require suppliers to use pathogen con-
trol measures on the farm or employ 
them during slaughter. Regulatory 
oversight by state agencies varies. 
Investigation findings, including en-
vironmental sampling, indicate that 
these markets could be heavily con-
taminated with S. enterica.
Preliminary results of a Massachu-
setts study found that fresh-killed chick-
ens from LBMs had higher Salmonella 
and Campylobacter spp. contamination 
rates than those for chickens purchased 
at grocery stores (10; T. Stiles, unpub. 
data). High-risk cultural preferences 
identified in these outbreaks included 
consuming raw or undercooked meat 
and cooking parts (e.g., feet, intestines) 
that are more likely to harbor Salmo-
nella spp. Further processing (e.g., 
de-feathering, butchering) conducted 
inside homes could lead to cross-con-
tamination in the household environ-
ment. Because of language and cultural 
barriers, existing food safety messages 
may not have been effective.
The number and type of LBMs 
and LAMs, the populations these mar-
kets serve, and regulatory authority 
vary considerably by state, and many 
case-patients and market owners have 
been reluctant to speak with public 
health authorities. Therefore, illness 
prevention requires a local, targeted ap-
proach. To strengthen regulations, some 
states have created guidelines and be-
gun regular inspection of these markets. 
Educational outreach has included dis-
tribution of posters, flyers, and magnets 
with safe food handling messages in 
multiple languages; collaboration with 
community groups; and education of 
market owners and workers. Given the 
various communities who use LBMs 
and LAMs, multifaceted interventions, 
including collaboration between human 
and animal health agencies, are needed 
to reduce disease risk among market 
patrons and their families.
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MLB1 Astrovirus  
in Children with  
Gastroenteritis, 
Italy
To the Editor: Astroviruses are 
notable agents of gastroenteritis in 
many mammalian and avian hosts. 
Astroviruses are nonenveloped RNA 
small, round, viruses (SRVs) with a 
single-stranded, positive sense RNA 
of 6.1 to 7.9 kb (1). The genome 
contains 2 nonstructural genes, open 
reading frame (ORF) 1a and 1b, and a 
capsid gene, ORF2, with short 5′  and 
3′  untranslated regions. Human astro-
viruses, a major cause of gastroenteri-
tis, are classified in the human astro-
virus species, comprising 8 serotypes 
(1). Recently, astroviruses genetically 
unrelated to canonical human astro-
viruses have been identified in hu-
man stools in several countries. These 
unusual astroviruses form 2 main 
genetic clades. One clade contains 
MLB1, MLB2, and MLB3 (2–4). The 
second clade contains VA1, VA2, VA3 
(also known as HMO-C, HMO-A, 
and HMO-B, respectively) and VA4 
(5,6). More recently, a VA1/HMO-C–
like virus was detected in brain tissue 
from an immunocompromised child 
with encephalitis (7). The discoveries 
of these viruses provide novel candi-
date agents of human disease and raise 
concerns inherent of possible zoonotic 
implications. Here we describe the de-
tection and genome characterization of 
MLB1-like astrovirus in a 4-year-old 
male child hospitalized with severe 
gastroenteritis during January 2007 
at the University Hospital of Parma, 
Italy. Clinical signs included vomit-
ing and severe diarrhea, with moder-
ate dehydration. The child was treated 
with rehydration and maintenance 
therapy (balanced glucose-electrolyte 
solutions) and completely recovered 
after 3 days. 
Fecal samples collected at ad-
mission were subjected to routine vi-
rologic (electron microscopy [EM], 
cell cultures, latex agglutination, and 
reverse transcription PCR) and bac-
teriologic (culturing with selective 
and differential media) examinations. 
Fecal samples tested negative for 
common bacterial (Clostridium dif-
ficile, Shigella spp., Salmonella spp., 
Yersinia enterocolitica, Staphylococ-
cus aureus, and Campylobacter spp.) 
and viral (adenovirus, rotavirus, noro-
virus, human astrovirus, enterovirus 
and sapovirus) enteric pathogens. 
However, through EM, SRV particles 
were observed in the feces of the pa-
tient (Figure, panel A). Despite sev-
eral efforts with additional consensus 
primer sets for calicivirus and entero-
virus, it was not possible to identify 
the SRVs detected by EM, and the 
case was archived as undiagnosed. 
However, beginning in 2008, several 
astroviruses genetically unrelated to 
canonical human astroviruses have 
been described (2). Broadly reactive 
consensus primers for astrovirus (8) 
spanning the RNA-dependent RNA 
polymerase (RdRp, ORF1b), along 
with sets of specific primers for these 
novel astroviruses (2), have been de-
signed. By using these sets of primers, 
astrovirus RNA was detected in the 
sample. Upon sequence analysis of a 
small ORF2 fragment, the astrovirus 
strain (ITA/2007/PR326) displayed 
up to 97.8% nucleotide identity to 
MLB1-like viruses. Fragments of the 
genomic RNA in ORF1a (1,173 nt), 
ORF1b, and the genome 3′  end (2,930 
nt), including the full-length ORF2, 
were sequenced by using primers spe-
cific for MLB1-like astroviruses and 
Figure.	 Electron	microscopy	 images	 of	 astrovirus-like	 particles	 in	 fecal	 samples	 from	 2	
patients	in	Italy:	A)	strain	ITA/2007/PR326,	from	a	4-year-old	child	hospitalized	in	January	
2007;	and	B)	strain	ITA/2008/PR3147,	from	a	14-month-old	child	hospitalized	in	November	
2008.	The	viral	particles	are	≈28–30	nm	in	diameter.	Scale	bars	indicate	100	nm.
